The paper studies the influence of homophily, a tendency of people to interact more with those who are similar to them, on the optimal strategies of a monopolist. In the model there are two types of consumers, which differ in linking preferences and the desirable design of the product. Consumers are engaged in word of mouth communication and can learn about the product directly from advertisement or from their neighbors. The monopolist uses product design and price to influence both who buys the product and the pattern of communication that take place within the network. We find a number of results: (i) for low levels of homophily the compromise product designed to attract both types of consumers is preferred to specialized products even if there is no cost of producing more than one product; (ii) in the presence of word of mouth demand is more elastic for products, interest in which promotes friendship relationships; (iii) social welfare is increasing in the level of homophily; and (iv) a product designed to attract two types of consumers may be optimal even if the monopolist is interested only in one type. JEL Classification numbers: D21, D42, D60, D83, L11, L12
Introduction
In the last decade word of mouth (WOM hereafter) and viral marketing have received a lot of attention from mass-media and the scientific community as efficient marketing tools (see for instance Campbell, 2009 , Goyal and Galeotti, 2007 , Leskovec et al. 2007 , and Iribarren and Moro, 2007) . The idea that a company can recruit consumers to advertise its products for free is really exciting. WOM marketing takes advantage of the natural human inclination to spread information. A study by Reichheld (2003) shows that willingness of consumers to recommend a company to their friends is by far the best predictor of a company's growth.
Apart from being efficient when it works, performance of a WOM campaign is quite uncertain. A report by Riley and Wigder (2007) from Jupiter Research reveals that only 15% of viral campaigns are considered to be successful, moreover 55% of companies planned to reduce the use of this tactic next year.
We show that volatile behavior of WOM marketing can be explained by a phenomenon known as homophily. Homophily is a tendency of people to interact more with those who are similar to them and it has been documented at least since Aristotle's time. 1 The term homophily appeared in the sociological literature for the first time in Lazarsfeld and Mertons (1954) who also quoted the proverbial expression -"birds of a feather flock together," which has summarized homophily ever since.
Our paper contributes to the WOM literature in two dimensions. First and most importantly, the paper introduces homophily into the network upon which WOM spreads and studies its impact on the optimal strategy of the monopolist. The notion of homophily enriches the network structure by specifying a probability of friendship relationships among groups of consumers. Second, the paper extends the monopolist's problem by including product design that affects further WOM communication. To the author's best knowledge product design has not been the subject of academic research in the framework of WOM marketing.
The model proceeds as follows. There is a monopolist that sells a product to an initially uninformed population of heterogeneous consumers of two types. The consumers across types differ in friendship preferences and desirable design of the product. Within types consumers differ in a willingness to pay for the product. Consumers are connected by a social network, which is represented by a random graph with arbitrary degree distribution. Preferences of consumers over friendship relationships in a network are reflected by a bias in linking. Consumers communicate with their friends and may learn about the existence of the product from neighbors who have already acquired it. The monopolist knows the degree distribution and strategically chooses the price and design of the product. To induce sales the monopolist advertises the product directly to an infinitesimal part of the population and the rest of population is expected to find out about the product through WOM communication.
Our analysis begins by examining necessary conditions on network structure such that WOM can spread over a significant proportion of the population 2 . This was the case of such remarkable examples as diffusion of Hotmail accounts 3 and the advertising campaign of "The Blair Witch Project" (tiny budget movie). We find that in sparse networks a sufficiently high level of homophily is necessary condition for success of WOM campaign. When society exhibits homophily, interests of connected consumers are correlated and the monopolist can develop the product that is attractive for long chains of connected consumers.
We turn next to the optimal product design. Network literature on diffusion assumes that the message to be spread in the network is given, and focuses on the effect of network structure on its propagation (for a survey see Geroski, 2000) . In contrast, we assume an active role of the monopolist which designs a message for the network by choosing the characteristics of product. In our base-line model we find that from an available segment of designs only two types of design are optimal -a compromise and a specialized one. Moreover, to make the optimal choice between them the monopolist needs to know only one characteristic of the network -the level of homophily.
The sociological literature on homophily adopts a view that diversity of individual's contacts is a desirable property per se (e.g. Moody, 2001) . Although this assertion could be supported by evidence, no rigorous analysis has been made. Perhaps surprisingly, in our model social welfare is increasing in the level of homophily. The result comes from informational and monetary benefits for consumers generated by an increase in the level of homophily. Informational benefits consist of higher awareness about the product. Monetary benefits come from a lower price charged by the monopolist which converts a higher awareness of the product into a higher volume of sales.
We turn next to the targeting of consumers. This popular idea in business and academic literature states that focusing advertisement efforts on a group of consumers is more efficient. We show that for a society with a low level of homophily the idea holds depending on the outreach of the WOM campaign. Namely, if demand triggered per advertisement is small then the monopolist focuses all efforts on one group. However, if the campaign is expected to reach the sufficient size, then the monopolist uses the compromise design of the product.
The term "freakonomics" has firmly entered our vocabularies. The popular book of the same name 4 with over 3 million copies sold worldwide gained popularity not only among the general public, but became well known in the academic community (e.g. Di- 2 In the network literature this phenomenon is known as global cascade 3 Hotmail spent a mere 50,000 dollars on traditional marketing and still grew from zero to 12 million users in 18 months. 4 Full name of the book: "Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything".
Nardo, 2006, DiNardo 2007, Rubinstein, 2006) . Despite extraordinary success the case of "Freakonomics" is not unique. One can recall such examples as "Linked: The New Science of Networks" on networks by Barabási, "The Selfish Gene" on evolution by Richard Dawkins etc. All these books provoked numerous discussions in academic circles, while their prime audience was the general public. Influenced by this phenomenon we consider a monopolist which is interested only in one type of consumers (for instance the academic community). We show that designing the product to be attractive to both types of consumers may be the optimal strategy even though consumers exhibit homophily in their linking preferences.
Related Literature
The paper bridges two streams of the literature. The first one studies strategic diffusion of information in networks (see for instance Campbell, 2009 , Goyal and Galeotti, 2007 , Galeotti and Mattozzi, 2008 . In this literature the network is represented by a generalized random graph. In our model we add more structure to a network by introducing homophily. The closest paper is Campbell (2009) , which considers optimal pricing strategies of a monopolist in the presence of WOM communication. While we consider the optimal price, the main focus of our paper is the effect of the homophily on the monopolist's decisions and social welfare. In addition, we study the optimal design of the product, which is absent in Campbell (2009 Golub and Jackson (2009) . They study how different mechanisms of communication operating through networks are affected by the homophily level of the society. The principal difference is that in our paper the monopolist takes an active role and influences WOM spreading by choosing the design of the product.
Within the broader literature that considers epidemic diffusion (see for instance Newman, 2002 and Sander et al., 2002) our paper contributes to the analysis of multi-type networks with homophily by extending Newman's generating functions approach. In particular we include type dependent probabilities for nodes to be operational (ability to transmit information further in the network).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model of strategic diffusion. In section 3 we derive the expected size of the cascade of sales per advertisement. Section 4 presents the main results on the optimal price and design strategies and considers welfare implications of homophily. Section 5 examines optimal product design and advertisement strategies when the monopolist can target advertisements by types of consumers. Section 6 considers robustness of the obtained results to the variation in shape of the preference frontier. Section 7 studies the optimal strategy of the monopolist which is interested only in one group of consumers. Section 8 considers the case of a global cascade of sales. Finally, section 9 outlines avenues for future research and concludes.
Model
We begin with a formal description of the model.
Network Structure
There is infinite population of consumers of measure 1, which are embedded into a social network. The population consists of consumers of two types -A and B. Consumers of type A constitute measure γ of the population and the rest are consumers of type B. We consider the case of two types, since it provides basic intuitions and insights, making the analysis transparent 5 .
The network is represented by a random graph characterized by a degree distribution {p k } ∞ k=0 and probabilities of ties among consumers (ρ A , ρ B ). The parameter ρ i , where i ∈ {A, B} is the probability that a randomly drawn link of consumer of type i leads to a consumer of the same type. Hence on average consumer of type A has proportion ρ A of her neighbors of type A and proportion 1 − ρ A of type B. Since there are only two types of consumers, a proportion of links going from A to B should be equal to proportion of links going from B to A. Using this fact one can express ρ B in terms of ρ A :
Therefore, without loss of generality, we have one parameter ρ equal to ρ A . The parameter ρ represents the level of homophily of the society, since it specifies the probability of friendship relationships among two types of consumers.
We adopt some key definitions concerning measurement of the level of homophily from Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009). A benchmark case that we will use extensively is the case where links among consumers are formed with uniform probability independently of a type. The tendency of friendships to be biased towards own type beyond the relative proportion in the population is referred in the sociological literature as "inbreeding homophily" (see, for example Coleman, 1958 , Marsden, 1987 and McPherson et al., 2001 . In this case the proportion of links going to consumers of the same type is higher than otherwise would be implied by random matching. 
Definition 2. The society exhibits homophily if ρ > γ
There are also networks in which the situation can be reversed and social ties are biased towards different-type friendships (e.g. sexual networks).
Definition 3. The society exhibits heterophily if ρ < γ
If consumers are matched randomly with uniform probability then consumers of type A have on average proportion ρ = γ of neighbors of the same type and expression (1) implies that ρ B = (1 − γ). Moreover, if consumers of type A are linked more often among themselves compared to the case of random matching that is, ρ > γ then ρ B > (1 − γ).
This description of the network allows us to capture two features. First, we model two types of consumers with potentially different preferences towards characteristics of the product. Second, we describe how these two groups of consumers are interconnected. Figure 1 illustrates 3 different networks with the same degree distribution, moreover all nodes preserve the same connectivity. The only parameter that changes is the level of homophily of the society. As one can see, depending on ρ networks range from perfectly mixed to two separated graphs, where consumers of type A are completely disjoint from consumers of type B. In the rest of the paper we argue that all three network structures have quite different implications for spreading of the word of mouth in a network and hence the optimal strategy of the monopolist crucially depends on the homophily.
Preferences of Consumers
In the model, consumers, in addition of having different linking preferences differ in two other respects. First, across types consumers differ in preferences towards design of the product. Consumers of type A prefer one characteristic of the product while consumers of type B are interested in the opposite feature. Second, within types consumers differ in On the left hand side preferences frontier with characteristic of the product been marked by circle. On the right hand side implied social network, with probability to buy the product shown by intensity of the color.
the reservation price they are willing to pay for the product and the minimal level of the desirable characteristic which induces them to buy the product. More formally, in the model two variables affect the decision of consumers: the price P ∈ [0, 1] and characteristic of the product w ∈ [0, 1]. For concreteness, a consumer of type A buys the product if characteristic is higher than her threshold characteristic level and price is lower than her reservation price. In contrast, a consumer of type B buys the product if the characteristic is lower than her threshold characteristic level and the price is lower than the reservation price.
We assume that within type the reservation price and the characteristic threshold are independently and identically distributed according to the uniform distribution. Taking integrals over characteristic and price it is easy to show that given that a randomly chosen consumer of type A is aware of the product she buys it with probability q A = (1 − P )w and type B buys with probability q B = (1 − P )(1 − w).
There is a preference frontier, see Figure 2 , which encompasses all admissible pairs of probabilities for two types to buy the product. By choosing the design of the product the monopolist identifies one point on the frontier and thus chooses a probability pair (q A , q B ). The increase in P moves frontier inwards, simultaneously decreasing the probabilities to buy the product for two types, and decrease in P moves frontier outwards.
In the paper we will encounter two special types of product design.
Definition 4. The design is called symmetric if the product characteristic w is such that two types of consumers acquire the product with the same probability q A = q B .
In the case of a linear frontier the symmetric design is represented by w = Definition 5. The design is called specialized if product the characteristic w ∈ {0, 1}, which implies that only one type of consumers acquires the product.
These two types of design represent different marketing strategies. A symmetric design intents to satisfy the needs of both types of consumers, without giving preference to any of them, while the specialized design implies focusing on one type and completely neglecting the other.
One of the possible examples can be buyers of new TV-sets. One type of buyers are "geeks" who prefer to have complicated menus, where they can tune up every aspect of their TV-set. The other type of consumers prefer simple TV-sets, which they can literally "plug and play". Within both types consumers differ in the price they are willing to pay for a TV-set and requirements on minimal functionality in order to buy it.
Information Flow
We assume that the product is new for the market and consumers have no prior knowledge of its existence. A consumer learns about the product either by means of direct advertisement or from friends. Once a consumer of type i knows about the product she acquires it with probability q i . When a consumer starts to use the product, her neighbors learn about it and can purchase it as well. Information spreading stops if in the previous period no one has bought the product.
There are two possible scenarios of information spreading: information propagates to some finite number of consumers and than stops or continues to propagate unboundedly. Let us give precise definition of the latter case: Definition 6. We say that the global cascade of sales arises if ultimately some noninfinitesimal proportion of the population buys the product.
Depending wether the global cascade of sales arises there are two techniques available to study diffusion of information. The main results of the paper are developed for the case when there is no global cascade of sales, while in section 8 we study what happens beyond finite sales.
Monopoly Problem
The monopolist develops new product and introduces it to consumers who are engaged in WOM communication. In the model the monopolist chooses design of the product w and price P to maximize profits. To induce sales the monopolist advertises the product directly to an infinitesimal part of the population and the rest of the population is expected to find out about the product through WOM communication.
Cascade of Sales
In this section we derive an expression for the expected size of the sales cascade per advertisement and study its properties. The analysis is done assuming that there is no global cascade of sales. In the derivation of an expression for size of sales cascade we rely on generating functions approach for multi-type nodes based on Newman (2003) . The main focus of Newman's paper is heterogeneity of types in terms of degree distribution. Our paper adopts different perspective. While two types of consumers enjoy the same degree distribution, they differ in the probabilities to purchase the product. Hence in the model further transmission of information depends on the type of consumer.
Generating Functions Approach
In the field of complex networks generating functions have been introduced by Newman et al. (2001) and since than are widely used. The main idea is that characteristic functions completely describe probability distribution which is sufficient characteristic of random graph. Generating functions allow to calculate various local and global properties, such as average degree, average size of component, etc.
Before going to generating functions we need to characterize neighborhood of randomly picked node. If we select a node at random its links can be partitioned into two groups: links to nodes of the same type and links to nodes of another type. Suppose that the randomly taken node is of type A and has k links. The probability that node has j ≤ k links to nodes of the same type is given by an binomial expression:
Now we can define a pseudo-generating function of node's connectivity of type A, which buys the product:
These functions are known as pseudo-generating due to the fact that they do not sum to 1, since not all consumers buy the product. Using binomial identity we can perform the sum over j and expression reduces to following:
A pseudo-generating function of degree distribution of a neighboring node of consumer of type A is:
where ξ(k) is a degree distribution of neighboring node which is given by:
jp(j) An important pseudo-generating function that we will use extensively is one associated with excess degree distribution of neighboring node. So we find generating function of excess number of links of node of type A to which we arrive following randomly-picked link:
Note, when x = y, or in other words nodes have only one type, we come back to a usual pseudo-generating function of excess degree of neighboring node:
In the following analysis we assume that the underlying conditions are such that no giant component of consumers who buy the product arises. The case of giant cascade of sales is considered in the section 8. Let us denote by H i 1 (x, y), where i ∈ {A, B} generating functions of distribution of sizes of finite components of buyers, which can be reached by following a randomly chosen link that leads to a consumer of type i. If consumer of type i does not buy the product component is empty (since information does not spread any further). This happens with probability:
However, with complementary probability a consumer with degree k buys the product and transmits information to its neighbors. Further spread of information is subject to analogous considerations for k − 1 additional links. This leads us to the following selfconsistency conditions for H i 1 (x, y):
we can define generating function of size of buyers components that can be reached through randomly chosen consumer of type A. Since a randomly taken consumer of type A does not buy the product with the probability 1 − F A 0 (1, 1) we have:
By analogy, the generating function of size of component of buyers that can be reached following links of any randomly chosen consumer of type B is:
We are interested in the number of consumers who eventually buy the product if we start from a consumer of type i. With abuse of notation (we assume that all functions are evaluated at the point x = 1, y = 1) the answer is a sum of derivatives with respect to x and y of H A 0 (x, y). Thus if we start from node of type A the number of buyers is given by H A 0x + H A 0y . On the other hand if we start from a node of type B a number of buyers is H B 0x + H B 0y . To find a number of consumers who will eventually buy the product if we advertise it to a randomly chosen consumer we need to find weighted sum. Recall that in the population there is proportion γ of consumers of type A and 1 − γ of type B. Thus if we advertise to the randomly chosen consumer the expected number of purchases is given by an expression:
The resulting expression is given in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The expected number of consumers who buy the product if the monopolist advertises it to a randomly chosen consumer is given by an expression:
where z 1 and z 2 are expected numbers of first and second neighbors correspondingly,
z 2F 1 and
First of all note that only the first two moments of the degree distribution are relevant for the propagation of cascade of sales, namely z 1 and z 2 . The first term of the expression (γ 1 − γ)I q A q B is the probability that a randomly chosen consumer will buy the product and transmit information further. The second term consists of two parts. The first part (γ 1 − γ)F 0 is a vector with components showing the number of the first neighbors of type A and type B who buy the product. The second part is a vector (I −F 1 ) −1 q A q B with components that represent numbers of purchases generated by flow of information to a randomly chosen consumer of type A and of type B.
In the model consumers of different types have the same degree distribution and differ only in the preferences towards the product. If consumers of both types have the same preferences towards the product and buy the product with the probability q then the expression of cascade of sales reduces to the well known expression of average size of component of operational nodes:
The expression does not depend on the proportion of consumers of type A in the population γ and homophily level ρ, since all consumers are the same.
Main Results
We begin our analysis by considering conditions under which the global cascade of sales may arise. Next we turn to the problem of the monopolist and derive the optimal price and product design. We approach the maximization problem in two steps. In the first step we fix the price and solve the problem with respect to optimal design of the product. In the second step we relax assumption about exogenous price and allow monopolist to re-optimize with respect to price. This two-stage approach allows us to establish optimal strategy for the producer which can not influence price or when monopolist is interested only in market share. Next, we turn to the implications of homophily level for social welfare.
In particular, we show that in the case of linear preference frontier, the optimal product design abruptly changes from symmetric to specialized depending on the level of homophily. Moreover, other network characteristics such as density and variance of degree distribution do not affect the optimal design. The optimal price is decreasing function of the homophily level. Turning to welfare, we find that homophily is beneficial for both consumers and the monopolist.
In further analysis we assume that conditions are such that for any w ∈ [0, 1] global cascade of sales does not arise. This is relevant case for majority of marketing campaigns that are based on WOM. In the section 8 we study the global cascade of sales phase and look beyond finite volume of sales.
Arise of the Global Cascade of Sales
The majority of WOM campaign at most manage to induce multiple sales per advertisement. However, there are some exceptions such as "The Blair Witch Project" and Hotmail that managed to spread over a sizeable part of the population. In this section we identify conditions under which the firm acting optimally can sell the product to non-infinitesimal part of the population. We consider two cases, when price is endogenous and forms part of the decision process of monopolist and when price is exogenous.
Note that number of buyers of the product explodes when denominator of the expression for sales cascade, det(I −F 1 ) goes to 0. Thus the condition of appearance of the global cascade of sales is:
This is general form of the condition, which applies to any shape of the preferences frontier. To introduce trade-off embedded into monopolist's decision over product characteristic we should impose more structure on the preference frontier. We substitute probabilities to buy the product for two types given by q A and q B into the expression.
In order not to favor any group of consumers in the following analysis we assume that consumers are partitioned into two groups of equal size, thus consumers of type A and of type B constitute half of the population. In this case the expression (1) implies that ρ A = ρ B = ρ. Incorporating these assumptions we obtain following quadratic equation:
The network characteristics enter to the expression as a ratio of expected number of second neighbors to expected number of first neighbors. This ratio tells us how efficient is the network in diffusion of information. In particular, it tells us on average how many second neighbors become aware of the product if consumer shares the information with one of her first neighbor.
The following lemma summarizes the result for the case when price is exogenously given:
there exists non-empty interval [w, w] such that for any w ∈ [w, w] global cascade of sales arises.
Proof see appendix
It is interesting to note that in baseline case change in the regime does not depend on the degree distribution and hinges solely on the homophily level.
Now we turn to the case when the price is part of decision process of the monopolist. The condition on network structure in Lemma 2 becomes less restrictive when price decreases. The monopolist can set any price and thus to identify the condition we evaluate it for P = 0.
there exists non empty set E(z 2 /z 1 , ρ) such that for any (w, P ) ∈ E(z 2 /z 1 , ρ) global cascade of sales arises.
In a framework of one type of nodes, paper by Molloy and Reed (1995) for the first time derives the condition for appearance of the giant component of connected nodes, which is z 2 /z 1 > 1. In our case it is necessary condition for appearance of global cascade of purchases. Note that z 2 /z 1 < 1 does not satisfy condition in Lemma 2, since ρ ≤ 1. For the global cascade of sales to occur, there should exist giant component of connected consumers upon which WOM can spread.
The condition in Lemma 2 is stronger than z 2 /z 1 > 1 since not all consumers buy the product and consequently retransmit WOM further. One can separate the condition into two parts:
. The first part of the condition tells us that independently of homophily level ρ, if z 2 /z 1 is high enough then there is the global cascade of sales. This part of condition comes from the case when maximal spread of WOM is attained for symmetric characteristic w = 1 2 , which mitigates differences between nodes and makes ρ irrelevant. Moreover, it resembles the condition by Callaway et al. (2000) for appearance of the giant component of operational nodes. The condition is z 2 /z 1 ≥ 1 p , where p is a probability that randomly taking node is operational. In our case p = 1 2 (1 − P ), since all consumers like the product with the same probability 1 2 and are willing to purchase it with probability 1 − P .
The second part of the condition comes from the case when ρ > 1 2 and the maximal spread of WOM is attained when the monopolist chooses specialized design (w ∈ {0, 1}). In this case the information propagates only via consumers of one type that is why we need to adjust expected numbers of neighbors for one-type nodes. In this case expected number of first neighbors of the same type as consumer who are willing to buy the product is ρ(1 − P )z 1 and of the second is ρ 2 (1 − P ) 2 z 2 . Applying condition from Molloy and Reed (1995) we obtain z 2 /z 1 > 1 ρ(1−P ) which is the same as the second part of the condition in Lemma 2.
Optimal Design
In this section we consider the problem of the monopolist who takes the price as given and chooses the design of the product to maximize profits. The profits are given by the product of price and size of sales cascade, since cost of production is zero. If price is exogenously given by Lemma 2 we know that there is no global cascade if z 2 /z 1 ≤ min 2
Thus the monopolist profits maximization problem subject to preferences frontier is following:
Before going to results we develop some intuition. We already have seen in the proof of Lemma 2 the importance of homophily level. In the following exercise let us assume that society exhibits heterophily, which implies that nodes of type A more often connected to nodes of type B. Assume further that consumer of type A has bought the product. Since most of her neighbors are of type B, necessary condition for further spread of the information is attractiveness of the product to consumers of type B. However once they buy the product, most of their neighbors are of type A and process reiterates. Thus we can conclude that for sufficiently low homophily level optimal product design should be appealing to both groups of consumers. Assume now that homophily is sufficiently high and consumers of both types have majority of their links to consumers of the same type. Would it be optimal to focus on consumers of one type, and forget about others? The question is non-trivial since there are components of consumers of both types and if the monopolist focuses on one type all components of another type will not be reached.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 2. For any exogenously given price P following holds: The first result states that for two groups of consumers of equal size with linear preferences frontier if ρ = 1 2 (which for γ = 1 2 implies random mixing) the demand is not affected by the product characteristics w. In other words introduction of heterogeneity among consumers makes difference only if we have non-random mixing. That is why both heterogeneity of consumer's preferences and non-random mixing constitute key ingredients of the model.
The Proposition 2 confirms our intuition for the case of low homophily level and most importantly states that maximization problem has threshold solution. More precisely, independently of a degree distribution and price, if ρ becomes higher than 1 2 , the optimal product design abruptly changes from symmetric w * = 1 2 to specialized (w * ∈ {0, 1}). The explanation is following: when ρ is higher than 1 2 the majority of consumer's neighbors are of the same type as a consumer. That is why the design most attractive for the consumer also induces the highest sales of the product among her neighbors. Note that with w = 1 2 independently of ρ all consumers buy the product with equal probability
In the case of ρ > 1 2 and design w = 1 all neighbors of the same type buy the product and thus proportion is given by (1 − P )ρ which is greater than (1 − P ) 1 2 . The result does not depend of the degree distribution and the price, which makes it easy to apply. It is sufficient to know the homophily level of the society to choose the optimal design of the product.
Demand
Incorporating the optimal design of the product into expression for cascade of sales we obtain the demand function:
Note that for ρ ≤ 1 2 the demand does not depend on homophily parameter ρ. This result is not surprising, since in this case optimal design is given by symmetric characteristic w * = 1 2 . Symmetric design implies that both types of consumers buy the product with identical probability and mixing does not matter. As well note that both parts of the expression for demand coincide at the point ρ = Proposition 3. The demand is given by the function Q(P, ρ, z 1 , z 2 ), which has following properties:
(a) Q(P, ρ, z 1 , z 2 ) is continuous in ρ, moreover for ρ > 1 2 it is increasing and convex in ρ.
(b) Q(P, ρ, z 1 , z 2 ) is decreasing and convex in P .
(c) Price elasticity of demand is increasing in ρ, for ρ > 
Proof see appendix
In the comprehensive overview of sociological literature McPherson (2001) underlines the importance of the homophily as a shaping factor of any diffusion process that takes place on network. Particularly, he argues that information flows tend to be localized and status quo of individuals is maintained through reinforcement from their environments. These factors obstruct spread of the information and lead to further segregation in networks. In contrast, we show that if further transmission of the information depends on the adoption decision, homophily actually induces higher spread of the information. This happens because it is easier to construct message that penetrates homogenous medium.
Optimal Price
We have seen solution of the maximization problem with respect to the optimal design of the product. In this subsection we relax assumption of exogenous price and allow the monopolist to re-optimize with respect to price. The optimal product design is independent of the price chosen by the monopolist, thus all results for design hold for the optimal price as well. The monopolist maximizes profits and solves following problem with respect to price:
In the price setting the monopolist faces usual trade-off: increase in the price increases profits from each unit sold, but simultaneously decreases demand for the product. However, in the presence of WOM communication there is additional informational component of the trade-off. Since a consumer may spread information about the product only if she has acquired it, the price increase lowers product awareness of consumers. The optimal price behavior is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. The optimal price P * < 1 2 . Moreover for ρ ≥ 1 2 the optimal price P * is decreasing function of the homophily level, while for ρ < 1 2 , P * is independent of the homophily level.
Proof see appendix
The result comes from the fact that elasticity of the demand is increasing in ρ. Therefore, with increase in ρ, the monopolist reduces the price in attempt to seize bigger part of the society.
Social Welfare
The model allows us to address welfare implications of the homophily explicitly. The majority of the literature on the topic adopts the view that diversity of contacts is desirable property (e.g. Moody, 2001) . Although this assertion could be supported by evidences, no rigorous analysis has been made.
A recent paper by Currarini et al. (2009) shows that welfare implications of homophily crucially depend on the structure of consumers preferences. This points out the importance of explicit analysis of the question. In the following analysis we try to contribute to this end.
Consumer surplus is the integral of the demand function taken on the interval from price set by monopolist P * to the maximal reservation price, which in our case is 1.
We already have seen that for ρ ≥ 1 2 , demand is increasing in ρ, and thus increase in ρ shifts demand curve upwards. This happens, since more consumers become aware about the product. In the same time the increase in the homophily level by Proposition 4 leads to price decrease and more consumers buy the product for lower price. Both effects lead to increase of consumer surplus.
Producer surplus is defined as the area below the price of the product and marginal cost curve (M C) of producer. In our case M C = 0 and thus:
Proposition 5. The consumer surplus and monopolistic profits are both increasing in the level of homophily.
The main result of the proposition (5) states that if information retransmission is subject to adoption decision then society is better-off when homophily level is high. We can identify two driving forces of the result. First, the message penetrates homogenous groups easier and thus more consumers are aware about the product. Second, the price reduction facilitates diffusion of WOM more in the case of high homophily levels. These two effects are beneficial for both consumers and the monopolist.
The word of cautious should be said. In our analysis consumers do not derive utility from the contacts directly and just benefit from information flow. For example, the case of simultaneous flow of different information in the network could advocate for diversification of contacts. In the extreme case when the society exhibits homophily level 1, majority of the consumers would be cut from the half of the information in the network.
Example of Classical Random Graph
In the further analysis we will often refer to a special case of network which is known as classical random graph. The notion of random graph was first introduced by Paul Erdõs and Alfréd Rényi and since than it is the most studied model of graphs. Connectivity of nodes in random graph follows poisson degree distribution and arises in infinite networks where each node has uniform probability to create a link to any other node in the network.
In our case the probability of link existence between consumers of the same type is different from probability of link existence among types. One can think about the network of N consumers of two types where each consumer creates a link to any other consumer of the same type with probability ρz 1 N and to consumer of another type with probability
When N goes to infinity we obtain infinite network with two poisson degree distribution. One for links among consumers of the same type with mean ρz 1 and another of links among types with mean (1 − ρ)z 1 . Recall that the sum of two poisson variables also follows poisson distribution with mean equal to the sum of means. That is why if there is only one type, the network is classical random graph with average connectivity given by z 1 .
The optimal design of the product does not depend on the degree distribution and is given by the Proposition (2) . Incorporating relation between expected number of first and second neighbors in the case of poisson degree distribution the demand function:
In the case of poisson degree distribution the network is characterized by only one scalar 6 
Maximizing profits we obtain an expression for the optimal price, 78 which is given by:
The derivative of optimal price with respect to homophily level ρ is negative, thus optimal price is decreasing with homophily of the society:
To study the effect of network density on the optimal price we take derivative with respect to z 1 :
Thus the optimal price P * is decreasing in both average connectivity and homophily parameter ρ.
Turning to welfare, using the same line of arguments as we have outlined before one can show that increase in z 1 leads to higher consumer surplus. This happens since denser network implies higher diffusion of the information about the product and results in higher 6 In the case of poisson degree distribution z2 = z reduces to z1ρP 2 + 2P (1 − z1ρ) + z1ρ − 1 = 0. 8 Condition of no global cascade of sales in the case of poisson distribution is z1 < min{2, awareness of the consumers. Denser network also increases benefits for the monopolist to reduce the price, since now information spreads further. Both effects benefit consumers.
Targeted Advertisement
In the previous section we have considered the problem of the monopolist which cannot distinguish consumers by type. The monopolist, restricted by anonymity assumption, was advertising the product to randomly chosen subset of the population. This formulation is relevant for an advertisement through the mass media, when the monopolist can not control who is watching or hearing an advertisement. However, in the case of direct advertisement there is the possibility to target chosen group of the population. For example, monopolist which is interested in students' community, can distribute an advertisement at a university or specifically ask for student's id-card.
In this section we are going to relax anonymity assumption and allow the monopolist to observe types of consumers. More precisely, we assume that monopolist chooses the design w and the proportion α of consumers of type A in the subset selected for targeted advertisement. Note, before proportion of consumers of type A which receive advertisement was fixed exogenously at the level γ, which is proportion of nodes of type A in the society. In analytical part for tractability of the problem we assume that the price P is exogenously given. Thus the maximization problem of the monopolist becomes:
The expression for sales cascade s(q A , q B , ρ, α, z 1 , z 2 ) can be rewritten as linear combination of number of purchases made by consumers of type A and of type B: α × s A (q A , q B , ρ, α, z 1 , z 2 ) + (1 − α) × s B (q A , q B , ρ, α, z 1 , z 2 ). Given linear structure of the problem in terms of α it is easy to see that if q A = q B the optimal targeting proportion has a corner solution. Namely, the solution depends whether cascade of sales induced by advertisement is higher if we advertise to a consumer of type A or of type B. In the case when q A = q B both types of consumers buy the product with the same probability and thus all values of α on the interval [0, 1] are optimal. Proposition 6. Targeting one type of consumers in advertisement is always optimal for the monopolist.
Since preference frontier is symmetric, without loss of generality assume that the monopolist targets consumers of type A and hence α * = 1. Moreover by symmetric nature of the problem if α * = 1 and some w * is the solution then α * = 0 and 1 − w * is the solution as well. For the following analysis we assume α * = 1.
The characterization of the optimal product design for arbitrary degree distribution when monopolist can target advertisement becomes intractable. In the following analysis we focus on the the case of classical random graphs with poisson degree distribution.
The intuition tells us that possibility of targeting consumers for advertisement would unavoidably bring the bias towards characteristic of the product favorable for consumers of targeted type. The bias itself can be of two forms. The first form is that the threshold level of homophily, which separates specialized design (w ∈ {0, 1}) and symmetric (w = 1 2 ) moves to new level, which is lower than 1 2 . The second form is that for ρ lower than new threshold level the optimal design belongs to the interval such that for ρ ≥ρ T (z 1 , P ) the monopolist will advertise and specialize only on one type of consumers (α * = 1 and w * = 1). For ρ <ρ T (z 1 , P ) the optimal advertisement is still α * = 1, but the optimal characteristic is given by:
Proof see appendix
The success of WOM campaign to high extend depends on the effectiveness of the direct advertisement, which should persuade receiving consumers to buy the product. The monopolist selecting only one type of consumers for advertisement and designs product more attractive to them induces consumers who receive the advertisement to buy the product. This happens even when society exhibits heterophily (ρ < 1 2 ), and propagation of WOM depends whether product is attractive enough to both types of consumers.
Note that the threshold level of homophilyρ T (z 1 , P ) is increasing in z 1 . Moreover, when z 1 approaches the limiting value of 2(1 − P ) −1 the threshold levelρ T (z 1 , P ) coincides with 1 2 , which is the threshold level in the case of non-targeted advertisement. In the case of poisson degree distribution z 1 is the only characteristic of the network and it represents network density. The rise in z 1 implies higher diffusion of WOM in the network since there are more channels to spread on. When z 1 goes to 2(1 − P ) −1 we approach the phase of the global cascade of sales and it becomes optimal to sacrifice some initial adopters, but design the product in a way that WOM can penetrate further in the network.
Non-Linear Shape of the Preference Frontier
In the previous analysis we developed results for the case of linear preference frontier. However, one can think about many examples of products, for which relationship between acquisition probabilities for two groups of consumer is not linear. These situations occur when attractiveness of the product for two types of consumers non-linearly varies in characteristic. For example, longer guarantee on the product is attractive for both types, while pink color of the product may be very welcome by one type and be unattractive for the other. In this situations shape of the frontier can vary from concave to convex depending on the product in question.
In this section we want to address the robustness of results to the change in curvature of the preference frontier that the monopolist faces. We consider CES functional form of the preference frontier which allows to model variety of shapes. Thus probabilities to buy the product for two types of consumers are related in the following manner:
By varying parameter r we can get shapes of the preferences frontier that include bend inward circle (r = 0.562), linear function (r = 1), bend outward circle (r = 2) and everything in between.
Arise of the Global Cascade of Sales
Similar to analysis in the case of linear frontier an important question to address is conditions under which the global cascade of sales occurs. An important parameter for appearance of the global cascade of sales is r, degree of curvature of the frontier. For example, if r goes to ∞, as we know from properties of CES function, we have frontier which is a step function and the best design of the product is w = 1 which implies q A = q B = 1 − P . In this case two types of consumers always are fully satisfied by the design of the product and thus effectively there is only one type of consumers. The condition for appearance of global cascade in this case is well known in networks literature, namely
For arbitrary values of r the condition of existence of global cascade is given by an inequality:
Due to the arbitrary power of the polynomial equation it is impossible to have analytical solution, however we can identified broad set of parameters for which global cascade of sales occurs. The results are summarized in the following proposition: Proposition 8. For arbitrary degree distribution and concavity parameter r global cascade arises if
. Proof see appendix
Problem of the Monopolist
Now we are going to address robustness of the optimal design obtained for linear case to the change in the convexity of the preference frontier. This subsection consists of two parts: analytical and numerical. In analytical part we focus on the case of exogenous price and poisson degree distribution and find conditions such that symmetric and specialized designs are solutions to the maximization problem. In the second part we endogenize price and solve problem numerically for arbitrary type of degree distribution.
Similarly to analysis of the section 5 we assume poisson degree distribution and exogenous price. The monopolist faces non-linear preferences frontier and chooses design of the product to maximize profits. The monopolist solves following maximization problem:
We identify homophily level such that symmetric and specialized designs are solutions. The results are summarized by the following proposition: Proposition 9. Given that exogenous price and poisson degree distribution following holds:
2z 1 (1−P ) such that the optimal design is symmetric w * = 1 2 1 r if ρ <ρ N L (r, P, z 1 ) and otherwise the optimal design is specialized w * ∈ {0, 1}. 
Proof see appendix
The proposition states that the optimal design preserves the same structure as in the case of linear preferences frontier. More precisely, for r < 1, only symmetric and specialized designs are optimal. They are separated by new threshold valueρ N L (r, P, z 1 ). For r > 1, and low levels of ρ, symmetric design is optimal, however for high levels of ρ solution gradually changes from symmetric to specialized. In the case of bend outward shape of the frontier (r > 1) the optimal design is biased towards the symmetric design. The explanation is following: while corner solutions are still as attractive as they were in the problem with r = 1 (endpoints are fixed), symmetric solution becomes more appealing. This happens since in the case of r > 1 by moving to the center of the symmetry from q A = 1 we are gaining more of q B while sacrificing the same amount of q A as compared to the linear case with r = 1. For the case when r < 1 we have the opposite situation.
The threshold level of homophilyρ N L (r, P, z 1 ) is increasing in z 1 . Thus the denser the network the more appealing becomes symmetric design. The intuition is the same as for the case of targeted advertisement. Dense network implies potentially higher diffusion of the information and to penetrate further the product should be appealing for both types.
To check how general are results obtained for the case of poisson degree distribution we consider numerical solution for the scale free distribution. In a left part of the Figure  3 one can see a diagram of the structure of the solution. The diagram is made for scale free distribution with pdf Ck −3.34 , where C is normalizing constant. In this case number of first and second neighbors are z 1 = 1.23 and z 2 = 1.77.
One can see from the diagram that for r < 1 we have similar result as in linear case. Namely, there is the threshold level ofρ N L (r, z 1 , z 2 , P ) such that for ρ <ρ N L (r, z 1 , z 2 , P ) the optimal solution is symmetric and for values of ρ >ρ N L (r, z 1 , z 2 , P ) we have specialized solution. In the case of r > 1 the structure stays the same but after ρ =ρ N L (r, z 1 , z 2 , P ) 
Targeting One Type of Consumers
In this section we address the problem of the monopolist who is interested in attracting only one type of consumers, for concreteness lets assume that this is type B. This situation could arise if the monopolist believes that consumers differ in their post purchase behavior. For example, once consumer of type B buys the product she becomes loyal customer and makes further purchases of the same brand, while consumers of type A are accidental buyers. For the sake of simplicity we assume that monopolist completely ignores consumers of type A. Assume further that the monopolist maximizes awareness of the brand and chooses price equal to 0. The main question is than: what is the optimal characteristic of the product that maximizes number of purchases of the product by consumers of type B?
The first guess could be that the monopolist should completely forget about consumers of type A and design the product as attractable as possible to consumers of type B. The first guess however turns out to be wrong for broad set of the parameters. Assume for example that homophily level of the society is low, this implies that a lot of consumers of type B are connected to consumers of type A. Hence to spread information should be able to pass through consumers of type A. A Figure 4a illustrates the optimal product design for the case of groups of consumers of equal size (γ = 1 2 ) and expected number of neighbors are z 1 = 1.7 and z 2 = 2. Note that for ρ ∈ [0, 0.39] the optimal design is such that there is non zero probability for consumers of type A to buy the product. The result requires low levels of homophily and actually implies heterophily of the society. We already have seen similar answer in the case when the monopolist gets profits from both types.
The more surprising result is one where although society exhibits homophily it is still optimal to make product attractive for the consumers of type A. The only thing that result requires is that proportion of consumers of type A should be sufficiently high. A Figure 4b illustrates the optimal product design for the case when consumers of type A constitute 80% of the population (γ = 0.8) and expected number of neighbors are as before z 1 = 1.7 and z 2 = 2. Note that ρ ∈ [0.8, 1] implies that society exhibits homophily and there is a range of ρ ∈ [0.8, 0.81] such that optimal characteristic w is not zero. Another surprising feature of the result is that for sufficiently small ρ it is optimal to construct the product more attractive to consumers of type A than to B.
The Global Cascade Case
In the previous sections we have seen what happens when WOM marketing campaign does not trigger global cascade of sales. In majority of the situations this is the case. However, WOM campaigns of diffusion of Hotmail accounts and "The Blair Witch Project" (tiny budget film) were so successful that actually a considerable fraction of the population became aware of the product. In this cases we can no longer apply techniques from the previous sections.
So let us assume that conditions are such that global cascade of sales arises, by Lemma (2) it happens when
To determine the fraction of the population that buys the product we turn back to the generating functions, but instead of looking on the distribution of sizes of cascades we estimate fractional size of the global cascade. Assume that by following randomly chosen link we arrive to a consumer of type i then lets denote by u i the probability that this consumer does not have a link to the giant component of consumers who buy the product. We can obtain self-consistency condition for u i :
Using generating functions we can rewrite it as:
Having at hand u A and u B we can find probability that a randomly chosen consumer of type i does not form a part of the global cascade. It is equal to F i 0 (u A , u B ). Thus the probability that consumer is in giant component is given by:
where
Note that last expression insures that a number of links going from consumers of type A to consumers of type B should be equal of number of links going from consumers of type B to consumers of type A. However since we choose γ, ρ A and ρ B exogenously we can insure that this condition holds.
Assume that there are equal numbers of consumers of type A and type B, γ = Lemma 3. For two groups of equal sizes maximization problem of the monopolist becomes:
is the probability that randomly chosen link of consumer of type A leads to the giant component of buyers and y = ρ B u B +(1−ρ B )u A is the same for consumers of type B. The functions
Assuming linear preferences frontier, q A = (1 − P )w and q B = (1 − P )(1 − w) the maximization problem becomes:
Solution to the maximization problem is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 10. In the case when population is divided into two equally sized groups, γ = 1 2 , for any degree distribution following results hold:
is local maximum, which gives higher value then w ∈ {0, 1}.
• For ρ > 1 2 , w = {0, 1} are local maxima, which give higher value then w = 1 2 .
• For ρ = 
Conclusion
The importance of word of mouth communication for a company's performance is well documented by growing number of research. However, success of WOM marketing campaign varies enormously between product categories and within. We show that high variation in the performance of WOM campaigns can be explained by different homophily levels of the network towards different products. A key innovation of our paper is two-fold. First, we enrich the network structure by incorporating notion of homophily and study its impact on the optimal strategies of the monopolist. Second, monopolist is allowed to construct a message to network by choosing the design of the product. We found a number of results: (i) for low values of homophily monopolist designs the product attractive for all consumers, while for high enough values specialization is optimal; (ii) price elasticity of demand is increasing in the level of homophily; (iii) social welfare is increasing in the level of homophily; and (iv) a product designed to attract all buyers may be optimal even if the monopolist is interested only in one group of consumers. Flexibility of the model allows to outline several avenues for future research. The first one consists in introduction of influencers, consumers whose opinion affect opinion of many others. In the extension we want to match two observations: influencers on average enjoy higher average degree and their proportion in the population is small. The extension aimed to study an impact of homophily on spreading of information on a network with hubs and the effect of hubs on the optimal design of the product and price. In the case when society exhibits homophily influencers will be linked among themselves and will constitute core with access to a large share of consumers.
In the second extension we want to consider the optimal strategy for an entrant who faces presence of the incumbent firm on the market. We assume that the product is durable and consumer buys it only once. Hence the optimal strategies for the monopolist that we have studied in the paper are optimal for incumbent firm as well. We want to study how homophily affects optimal product design of an entrant and its effect on the variety of products that are produced. Finally we plan to compare predictions of the model with observations from the real market.
APPENDIX

Proof of Lemma 1
Let us find first what is the number of consumers of type A that buy the product if we advertise it to consumer of type A? The answer is:
Let us evaluate H A 0x (1, 1) with abuse of notation we assume that all function are being evaluated at point (1, 1):
Thus we can find H i 1x (x, y) by deriving self-consistency conditions and solving following system of linear equations at x = y = 1:
Let us rewrite it in canonical form:
or in more compact way
We have obtained linear system of 2 equations with 2 unknowns. The number of consumers of type A who buy the product if we consumer of type i finds out about the product from on of her friends H i 1x goes to infinity if determinant of the matrix I −F 1 is zero:
So solution is:
By doing analogous calculations we can get:
Now we can ask interesting questions. What is total number of infected nodes if we start from node of type A? The answer is following:
If we start from node of type B:
Let us define:
if we want to know what is the number of nodes, which are eventually infected starting from random node then we just need to calculate
Assuming that q A k = q A and q B k = q B we can find:
Let us rewrite equation in terms ofF 1 , note that
z 2F 1 thus:
It is easy to show that A(I − A) −1 = (I − A) −1 − I and thus we can rewrite as:
Note that expression for total number of consumers who buy the product actually depends on the linear combination of probability to infect initial node (γ 1 − γ) 
Proof of Lemma 2
Lets turn to the elasticity of the demand it is:
Taking derivative of E d with respect to ρ we obtain:
Which implies that elasticity of the demand is increasing in ρ.
Thus for ρ > 1 2 function is increasing in ρ.
Proof of Proposition 4
Price is decreasing in the homophily level The first order condition for P is:
Fixing network moments z 1 and z 2 lets call expression on the left hand side F (P, ρ). The second derivative with respect to P is: . The first derivative with respect to P is negative at 0:
If F (P, ρ) is convex in P is positive at 0 and negative at 1, we can conclude that function should intersect x-axis from above on the interval [0, 1] . This in turn implies that derivative of the F (P, ρ) at optimal price P = P * is negative,
, which implies that optimal price is always less than 1 2 . The derivative with respect to ρ is:
The sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the term in square brackets. The derivative is negative if P > 1 − 
As we already have shown for P = P * , ∂F (P * ,ρ) ∂P < 0 and thus derivative ∂P * ∂ρ is negative and optimal price P * is decreasing with ρ.
Profits are increasing in the level of homophily
Lets take two levels of homophily ρ 2 > ρ 1 . By proposition (3) we know that for any fixed price P following holds Q(P, ρ 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) > Q(P, ρ 1 , z 1 , z 2 ). Thus for any given price P the same is true for profits, namely P Q(P, ρ 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) > P Q(P, ρ 1 , z 1 , z 2 ). Assume further that P * 1 is optimal price for ρ 1 . Previous result states that π(ρ 2 , P * 1 ) > π(ρ 1 , P * 1 ) and thus by optimality we know that π(ρ 2 , P * 2 ) > π(ρ 2 , P * 1 ) > π(ρ 1 , P * 1 ), where P * 2 is optimal price for ρ 2 .
Proof of Proposition 7
The derivative of sales function is:
Note that denominator is always positive. It is easy to note that for ρ > 1 2 all terms in the numerator with w are positive. Thus if we prove that s (0) is positive we can conclude that optimal design is w * = 1. Substituting w = 0 into derivative we have:
which is positive for ρ < , thus w * = 1 is the solution to the problem. When ρ < 1 2 then all terms involving w are negative and numerator is decreasing function in w. Thus numerator has its minimum at w = 1 and condition that s (w) > 0 for all w ∈ [0, 1] is simply s (1) > 0. This in turn implies that if w * = 1 is maximum its also global maximum. The derivative at 1 is greater than zero if:
An expression on the left describes downward sloping parabola. The solution is:
It can be shown that ρ 2 > 1 and thus condition reduces to:
Combining with the case of ρ > 1 2 , we know that w * = 1 is solution if:
On the other hand for ρ <ρ(z 1 ) there is an interior solution which is given by:
It is interesting to note that w = 
Proof of Proposition 8
Lets denote by θ =
and by λ(w) following polynom:
The global cascade of sales occurs if there isw such that λ(w) ≤ 0. One can readily obtain condition for ρ. Just need to take the derivative with respect to ρ and to show that it is negative.Thus there is global cascade of sales if ρ >ρ(θ, r), where ρ(θ, r) = min
From previous analysis we know that candidates for maxima are extreme values and such that q A = q B , which in our case is 
From the first condition we can conclude that if ρ > . From the first condition we know that there is global cascade if ρ > 1 θ(1−P ) thus to insure existence of the global cascade we should prove that
So we have cascade if the former condition holds. However, we have assumed that θ > 2 
Proof of Proposition 9
Let us consider the case of poisson distribution, recall that in this case z 2 = z 2 1 . Substituting relation among number of neighbors into expression for sales cascade we obtain:
Let's find when w * = 0 is global maximum? It happens if for any w, s(0) ≥ s(w):
Note that denominators two fractions are positive due to condition of no global cascade, thus the sign of the expression depends on the numerator of combined terms, which is:
Note that expression describes downward sloping parabola and thus our condition will be in the form ρ 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ 2 , where ρ 1 and ρ 2 are solutions to the quadratic equation. Solving equation we obtain:
Our condition should hold for all w and thus we should find maximum of ρ 1 and minimum of ρ 2 .
In order to do this we should identify maximum and minimum of the term with w. Taking derivative of this term with respect to w we have:
Independently of r we can see that first derivative is zero at the point w = Substituting it back to condition for ρ we have:
r the minimum of last term is 1. Taking that into account we can write condition as:
On the other hand for r > 1, one can show that w * = 0 is never a solution. Lets evaluate derivative of sales at w = 0 for the case when r > 1 we have:
Thus we can establish that there isρ 2 such that if ρ <ρ 2 than the optimal characteristic is w = 
Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that probabilities to get infection do not depend on the number of links that node has: q A k = q A and q B k = q B . We obtain:
Note that last expression insures that a number of links going from nodes of type A to nodes of type B should be equal of number of links going from nodes of type B to nodes of type A. However since we choose γ, ρ A and ρ B exogenously we can insure that condition holds.
Or we can rewrite it as:
Let us denote by x = ρ A u A + (1 − ρ A )u B and by y = ρ B u B + (1 − ρ B )u A thus
Or equivalently:
After simplification:
Further assume that we have the same number of nodes of two types, γ = The case when firm's action has no effect.
Interesting case arises when ρ = 1 2 . It seems that w has no effect on the ultimate outbreak of the infection. Let us rewrite the problem: Note that in this case equations for x and y are the same and thus in equilibrium x = y. This in turn implies that w disappears from the maximization problem:
s.t.
Thus eventual outbreak is the same for all values of w and moreover it's size is equal to the giant component for homogenous nodes.
The case when specialized design is optimal. Assume that we want to check when it is optimal to focus on first group or equivalently when w = 1 is the solution. Note that w = 1 is corner solution that is why it is enough to show that derivative of This implies that w = 1 2 is always the critical point. What is left to proof is that it is maximum when ρ < Thus we can conclude that F (x * ) < 1. Thus 1 2Ĝ 1 (x) < 1 and consequentlyĜ 1 (x) < 2, which in turn implies that our condition always holds.
When w = On the other hand if w = 1 we have:
Due to the monotonicity of the G 0 (x) we know that S( Note that x is solution to fixed point of 1 − ρ + ρĜ 1 (x) at x * it should cross the 45 degree line and this in turn implies that ρĜ 1 (x) < 1 thus we have shown that 
